The global tragedy is that we have no means of evacuating the wounded

I see the heroism of a single person trying to stand up to a global tragedy.

The global tragedy is that we HAVE NO WAY TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED.

Please understand that modern stretchers are generally not suitable for evacuating the wounded! They are a means for evacuating the bodies of the deceased—nothing more.

It is a solution resorted to out of desperation, due to the lack of proper equipment. Because there is nothing else available. We have a complete functional failure in this regard.

Because our government lacks the conscience and sense to invest in proper means of evacuating the wounded. The money is there. If there’s one thing we have money for, it’s the evacuation—funds from our partners are available!

There’s simply no request from us, no clearly stated need.

The state is condemning Ukrainian soldiers in the combat zone to a slow death if they are wounded. That is the current tactical plan—there’s no other way to put it. Because without evacuation, it’s impossible to provide medical care. When there’s no medical care, even a minor injury—even a small piece of shrapnel—can lead to death or severe disability.

What is an NRK? It’s usually a SLOW vehicle, with an average speed not exceeding 7–10 km/h. At best. And in almost every single case, an evacuation turns into an operation lasting many hours, during which comrades turn gray with worry, the operators’ hearts ache with anxiety, and they pray to every god that the enemy’s reconnaissance drones won’t spot the NRK, which is crawling along like a turtle.

And how many times does that NRC vehicle not even make it to the wounded soldier—it gets taken apart by enemy UAVs along the way!

And how many times is that medical evacuation vehicle struck while already carrying a wounded soldier, with only body parts making it back?

And how many times has an NRK vehicle been blown up by a mine remotely planted by the enemy? And how many times (perhaps the most!) has the NRK vehicle not even made it there at all?

That’s why the company commander jumped into his own car—he realized there was no chance left with the NRC.

Besides being a slow means of transport, it’s usually incapable of providing protection against direct fire. In theory, there are armored capsules for the wounded, but this protection is ineffective; it’s more like a coffin for the wounded—and in fact, that’s often what it turns out to be. It offers little protection against mines or a direct hit from an anti-personnel mine.

In the combat zone, there must be vehicles that offer good protection against direct hits from anti-personnel mines and/or protection against ground-based explosive devices, as well as high mobility.

The ideal evacuation vehicle or medical evacuation vehicle is a well-armored MRAP-type vehicle, with remote or direct control, equipped with protective screens against shaped-charge warheads, capable of carrying heavy and powerful electronic warfare systems, and active countermeasures against UAVs. Under current conditions, if UAVs re-emerge as a threat on the battlefield, such a vehicle would be capable of reducing casualties among our infantry and drone operators on the front lines.

I’ve written about this before, but in the context of crew movement within the combat zone. The same logic applies now. We can estimate the approximate cost of various solutions.

“We see that domestic armored vehicles equipped with appropriate shields against drone attacks with shaped-charge warheads—such as the Kozak or Varta—can protect against most of the aforementioned threats.

Let’s compare their cost to the losses to the state budget in the event of a crew’s death. Let’s make the following assumptions. Let’s say the crew consists of four people; if the vehicle comes under fire, an average of two of them are killed. In this case, the loss to the state budget amounts to $720,000.

(..)

As we can see, investing in such equipment is extremely cost-effective, as it amounts in most cases to 30–50% of the expected budget losses resulting from the deaths of military personnel. It should be noted that, according to its declared specifications, the Varta is capable of protecting the crew from fairly powerful explosive devices.

When considering foreign specialized armored vehicles that provide a high level of protection against mines, purchasing them remains extremely cost-effective despite their higher price.

M-ATV – $600,000

Cougar — $700,000 ·

RG-31 — $600,000 ·

VAB — $600,000 ·

RG-33 — $600,000

As we can see, none of these high-end, mine-resistant armored vehicles exceeds the expected losses to Ukraine’s state budget resulting from the deaths of UAV crew members. This is a very profitable investment of our limited resources, since even if we lose a vehicle, our losses amount to 600,000, whereas under the current circumstances, we face BOTH LOSSES AND DEATH.

War is mathematics, cynical statistics, but within this cynicism lies an opportunity for us. With the numbers in hand, we can show exactly how funds should be spent. Perhaps some haven’t understood—we’re ALREADY paying these colossal compensation payments for the deaths of infantrymen, tank crews, UAV operators, and artillerymen, because we aren’t investing enough funds in PREVENTING budget losses resulting from the deaths of service members.

As for the current state of affairs, it is extremely dire. It is very rare for UAV crews to receive new vehicles from the government to operate in dangerous zones. For the most part, my colleagues travel in second-hand off-road vehicles provided by volunteers. And there is no question of any armor or mine protection. There isn’t even minimal protection for the vehicles against fragmentation munitions, which would allow them to withstand a strike from a guided projectile with an appropriate warhead. Retrofitting an SUV with such protection costs less than $50,000, which is an extremely small amount compared to what the state currently pays to the families of the fallen. And yet, this is an astronomical, unattainable sum for soldiers, who usually have to raise the money for their own transportation.

This is just one of many examples. There are plenty of others where money is no object. It shouldn’t be this way. Soldiers who are, figuratively speaking, “worth” 15 million shouldn’t be driving around in beat-up vehicles costing 5,000 to 7,000 dollars, with nothing to protect them from IEDs but a 500-dollar pump. There is no logic to this—neither moral nor immoral.

I’ll say it again—by definition, the money for all of this is in the budget. But our system is structured in such a way that officials bear incomparably less responsibility for human losses (including the related material damages). We are now seeing that it is procedurally much more difficult for Ukrainian officials to purchase expensive vehicles in advance than it is to later pay widows colossal sums equivalent to the cost of several of the most modern, best-protected pieces of equipment.”

Thanks to Maria Berlinska, I was able to bring this issue to the attention of Syrsky, who was commander-in-chief at the time. He supported the concept of large armored vehicles, but this initiative got lost in a sea of paperwork from various agencies and departments.

Obviously, armored ground vehicles are not the only option; there are others. For example, there are already quite a few models of powerful drones for air evacuation, including those manufactured in Ukraine. And by and large, close reconnaissance and strike missions can be carried out by modern robotic systems; the author of this article has personally built and deployed some of them, so he knows what he’s talking about. We have the ability to develop the technical capabilities needed to minimize the number of personnel in the combat zone.

But this requires a little more humanity among top leadership. Or a louder voice from those who are currently facing death head-on.

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