It wasn't Putin who made up the claims to Ukraine's territory and part of its population

Because I really dislike historical myths. Only 35 years have passed, and everything has already been mythologized, despite the existence of scholarly research available in plain language.

So, as the Soviet Union was falling apart, Russian democrats supported Ukraine’s sovereignty because their primary goal was to weaken the so-called “union center”—that is, Gorbachev and all the Soviet central institutions. Let me remind you that at that time, sovereignty was understood not as independence, but as the supremacy of one’s own laws within one’s own territory. Ukraine declared its sovereignty on July 16, 1990—by no means among the first, but rather the ninth out of fifteen “sister republics” (the Estonians were the first, back in November 1988). At that time, autonomous republics—that is, second-class republics (all of which remain part of the Russian Federation to this day)—also declared sovereignty; four days after Ukraine, North Ossetia declared sovereignty, followed by Karelia, Komi, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Yakutia-Sakha, and so on. I am writing this to provide context: no one in 1990 was particularly thinking about independence; even the People’s Movement of Ukraine had not yet declared a course toward independence—it would not do so until October of that year.

On November 19, 1990, Yeltsin and Kravchuk signed the Russian-Ukrainian treaty (which, incidentally, recognized not only sovereignty but also territorial integrity). Yeltsin was actively recruiting supporters of a “union without a center” to oppose Gorbachev. Perhaps, in an alternate history, all of this would have led to some kind of confederation. In other words, the idea that the Russian Federation and Ukraine were two separate states wasn’t even being considered at the time.

After independence was declared on August 24, 1991, Moscow suddenly realized that this was serious. The “democrats” were not prepared for this.

It took only two days for the Russian response to come. On August 26 (it was a Monday), President Yeltsin’s press secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, stated: The Russian Federation recognizes the republics’ right to self-determination, but in the event of the termination of allied relations, it reserves the right to raise the issue of revising borders. One of the leaders of the “democrats,” Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov, proposed reconsidering the status of Crimea, the regions of eastern Ukraine, and the Odesa region. Oleg Rumyantsev, secretary of the Constitutional Commission, characterized Ukrainian independence as an attempt to “stab victorious Russian democracy in the back.” Such are these “democrats.”

There’s more to come. On August 28, a large delegation led by Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi arrived in Kyiv (he was the one who “rescued” Gorbachev from Foros, so he wielded considerable authority at the time). The stated reason for the visit was to dispel mutual mistrust and stabilize relations. A rally of several thousand people took place near the Verkhovna Rada. Negotiations continued into the night. The outcome: mutual recognition of the right to independence, territorial integrity, and so on. It looked like a retreat by Moscow; the blackmail had failed. But at the same time, the communiqué contained a warning against the “uncontrolled collapse” of the USSR and mentioned joint economic and military structures. In other words: if you want to be independent—go ahead—but the economy and the army will remain joint.

The subsequent rhetoric from Rutskoi and other Moscow “democrats” was much harsher. In other words, Rutskoi was sent to defuse a potentially acute conflict, but they did not accept Ukraine’s independence.

The situation changed only on the eve of the referendum. On November 30, Yeltsin told Bush: “Well, if 70% of Ukrainians support independence, then the Russian Federation will recognize it.” It’s unlikely that Yeltsin believed this (but Bush did—perhaps he was better informed). Yeltsin explained his willingness primarily by his unwillingness to give the radicals a chance (here, all the terms are mixed up—at that time, in his understanding, “radicals” referred to extreme conservatives who supported the State Committee for the State of Emergency).

December 1 arrived. Over 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence, including over 80% in the east and over 50% in Crimea.

Next came the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Accords, the creation of the CIS, and the dissolution of the USSR.

Other countries around the world began to recognize Ukraine’s independence.

But in 1992, the Russian elite was deeply distressed by the loss of Ukraine. A classic example is an article by the Russian liberal, democrat, and anti-communist Alexander Minkin, published at the beginning of the year. The main theme of the article is a profound sense of resentment toward Ukraine, accusations of betrayal, and similar emotions. Around the same time, St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak called the idea that Crimea is part of Ukraine “nonsense.” The most eloquent statement regarding Ukraine’s independence is the famous poem by Joseph Brodsky, written most likely during those very days (the exact date is unknown). If you don’t know what this is about and have strong nerves—read it; I’ve posted the text in the comments because it isn’t publicly available. The poem is steeped in a deadly, inescapable resentment over the injustice and wrongdoing committed by Ukraine when it declared independence. Think about it: a man whom the empire threw into prison and into exile takes offense at those who want to break free from this “prison of nations.” Such were the sentiments among Russian “democrats” and “liberals.”

In summary, Russian “democrats” recognized Ukraine’s independence from the USSR, but considered Ukraine’s independence from Russia to be nonsense and treason. Ukraine can be independent, but only if it remains together with its “elder sister.” And a significant portion of the territory belongs to Ukraine as a result of a misunderstanding that must be corrected.

I will emphasize once again that it was not Putin who concocted the claims to Ukraine’s territories and part of its population. These claims were formulated by Russian “democrats” immediately after independence was declared. Fortunately, Russia plunged into a deep economic crisis (as did Ukraine), so there were no resources for a major conflict. Although Russian activity in Crimea began as early as May 1992, that is another story.

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