
politician
Putin has what is perhaps his last chance to achieve something with Trump's help
An intensification of the negotiation process is traditionally accompanied by a series of speculative predictions regarding the date the war will end.
And although the services of fortune-tellers are still in high demand here, it’s worth recalling once again how the war might actually end and what Witkoff and Kushner were doing in Moscow and Kyiv.
The years of the great war have tempered the maximalist demands of both sides. In the spring of 2022, it became clear that Putin did not have enough resources to capture all of Ukraine, so Russian troops were withdrawn from the north and redeployed to the east and south.
In the fall, after liberating parts of the Kharkiv region and Kherson, he chose a different path—he raised the cost of the war for Russia by carrying out a mobilization and ramping up the war economy.
This showed that Putin will stop only when achieving his war aims becomes too costly or impossible for him.
This, it seems, is precisely what Ukraine’s current strategy is aimed at: depriving Russia of the ability to endlessly replenish its army with manpower and weapons. It is a difficult path, but giving up resistance would only open up opportunities for Putin that, thanks to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, remain unrealistic today.
It is clear that Witkoff and Kushner did not fly to Moscow and Kyiv to discuss how to stop Putin by depriving him of his resources for war. The CIA director could have explained this, but Putin refused to meet with him. The U.S. administration’s goals boil down to convincing Putin that he has already “won.” And that continuing the war will not give him more than he has now and what he will be able to obtain immediately after fighting ceases along the current front line.
In other words, at this stage, there are only two more or less realistic scenarios for ending the war: either Putin will be unable to continue fighting without a significant increase in the resources deployed—which he is incapable of providing—or he will decide on his own that what has been achieved is already sufficient to declare the “objectives of the special military operation” fulfilled, and that continuing the war will not yield any further gains.
The Americans believe that Putin has a lot to think about. The slow pace of his army’s advance, the current state of the economy, and the domestic political situation in the U.S. (where the composition of Congress is likely to change as early as this fall, and in 2028 there will certainly be a different president)—all of this suggests that there may never be a better moment for an agreement. It is by no means certain that the next U.S. president will be inclined to offer the Kremlin anything at all. So the very last window—if there is one—during which Putin can achieve anything with their help is open right now. It will last approximately until mid-spring 2027, when the U.S. will finally enter the presidential election cycle. If Putin fails to meet this deadline, the Americans will no longer be able to help him in any way.
This is precisely the logic behind the U.S. strategy of shuttle diplomacy. It explains the visits to Moscow, Witkoff’s reluctance to make harsh assessments of Putin, and many other nuances. The Americans are trying to convince Putin that time is working against him. Putin, it seems, is trying to convince the Americans of the opposite. And, to be honest, it’s still unclear which side is more successful in persuading the other.
Author

Mykola Kniazhitsky politician
All materialsUkrainian journalist and Member of the Ukrainian Parliament (People’s Deputy) of the 7th, 8th, and 9th convocations. Author of the Language Law and initiator of a complete ban on the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Previously, he served as the head of the media companies and television channels Tonis, STB, UT-1, and Gazeta 24, as well as chairman of the editorial board of TVi. He was a member of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.