Only two things can stop Putin

The Southern Kuril Islands were occupied by the USSR after World War II. This is an illegal occupation, and Russian jurisdiction over them is not recognized by virtually all countries in the world, including Ukraine, the United States, the EU, and China. This is precisely why a peace treaty has never been concluded between Japan and Russia, as such a treaty requires mutual agreement on borders and sovereignty.

This example illustrates why there can be no peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Under the current political regime, Russia will not liberate the occupied territories or recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty. Ukraine, for its part, cannot even theoretically relinquish its territories, as this is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Therefore, until the Russian occupation is fully ended, a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia is impossible.

Since a peace treaty is unattainable, the best outcome diplomacy can achieve is an agreement on a temporary truce and a ceasefire. Something similar to the end of the war between North and South Korea or between Turkey and Cyprus. And this is precisely what Russia has categorically refused since the first day of the full-scale invasion. Just today, Lavrov confirmed this once again.

In other words, until there is a change in the political regime in Moscow, the war between Ukraine and Russia will not officially end.

Since Putin remains optimistic about achieving his strategic goals by military means, only two things can stop him: Putin’s conviction that the war’s objectives have already been achieved, or the realization that they cannot be achieved with available resources, and that it is impossible to mobilize new ones due to their unavailability or prohibitively high cost.

As can be seen, the U.S. administration’s negotiation strategy is aimed precisely at the first factor. Since early 2025, the Americans have been offering various incentives that, taken together, could be interpreted by Putin as a “victory.” The range of proposals—from lifting sanctions to officially recognizing Russian jurisdiction over Crimea—is so broad that even a complete military victory and the transformation of Ukraine into a large “DPR” would not give Russia what Trump is offering simply in exchange for a ceasefire.

Instead, the strategy of Ukraine and our European allies boils down to implementing the second factor. This involves halting the enemy’s advance on the front lines and escalating military operations on Russian territory. Under such pressure, Putin must realize the impossibility of achieving his goals once the cost of further aggression becomes unacceptable.

The problem is that both factors are subjective in nature and exist solely in the mind of one person in the Kremlin. Putin’s strategic goal remains the destruction of an independent Ukraine, and that is precisely what he is fighting for. He considers this his own historical mission, so he pays no heed to the price Russia is paying and continues to raise the stakes.

On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to wage a war of this intensity and to find the resources to do so. In a resource-based standoff with all of Europe—as is effectively happening right now—Russia’s chances are by no means certain, especially since it is gradually turning into a “large DPR” itself, and it is far from certain that this process can be stopped.

Finally, it is worth recalling a quote from Sergey Lavrov: “This war will end someday. We will defend our truth no matter what. But I cannot yet imagine how we will live from here on out.”

In other words, the Russian leadership is fully aware that the question is no longer just about when this war will end. The question is when Russia itself will stop viewing its own catastrophe as a victory. Because only then will the Kremlin have a real incentive to stop the war.

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