"The Fedorov Case": Zaluzhny Remains Zelenskyy's Main Potential Rival in the Upcoming Election

There is a great deal of interest in this information due to the controversial and sensational political events of the second half of July (the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov from his post as Ukraine’s Minister of Defense; the protests that erupted in connection with this dismissal; the change in the government and the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc.). However, interpretations of this sociological data are often highly subjective and contradictory. Some commentators even speak of a “war of the polls” (the ratings from the “Rating” sociological group versus those from SOCIS). The fact is that President Zelenskyy’s approval ratings from these two polling centers differ significantly; accordingly, Zelenskyy’s critics eagerly cite data from the SOCIS survey, while Zelenskyy’s supporters, on the other hand, cite data from the latest poll by the “Rating” sociological group.

In my view, we should not simply interpret the data from individual polls (whichever suits our preferences), but rather identify trends in approval ratings based on data from various polls, while also taking into account the dynamics of those ratings. This is necessary to assess changes in public sentiment following the controversial events surrounding the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov from his post as Ukraine’s Minister of Defense (for the purposes of this text, I’ll refer to this situation as the “Fedorov case”).

Data from most polls provide grounds for identifying the following trends in public opinion.

In their latest polls, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and SOCIS have recorded a noticeable decline in trust ratings for President Zelenskyy.

According to KIIS, compared to May 2026, the number of those who trust President Zelenskyy decreased from 61% to 55%, while the share of those who do not trust the President of Ukraine increased during this period from 34% to 40%.

According to SOCIS, President Zelenskyy’s approval rating fell from 46.3% in March 2026 to 42.5% in early August 2026, representing a 3.8% decline. The share of those who do not trust President Zelenskyy increased from 49.1% in March to 54%, a rise of 4.9%.

The “Rating” polling group also recorded a slight decline in President Zelenskyy’s approval rating-from 62% (in early July 2026) to 59% (in early August 2026). At the same time, the share of those who fully trust President Zelenskyy decreased from 33% in early July to 26% at the time of Fedorov’s resignation, and to 28% in early August.

Thus, it can be concluded that President Zelenskyy’s approval ratings deteriorated noticeably following the conflict surrounding Mykhailo Fedorov, but they did not collapse.

The situation is similar with regard to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s approval ratings.

According to SOCIS, in March 2026, 22.6% of respondents were ready to vote for Zelenskyy, while in August 2026, that figure stood at 17.8% (of all respondents). In other words, Zelenskyy’s presidential approval rating dropped by 4.8%.

If we compare the polls conducted by the “Rating” social group, we see a similar situation, specifically during the period from June to early August 2026. In June, 32% of all respondents were ready to vote for Zelenskyy, while in early August, only 25% were.

KIIS does not publish electoral ratings. However, based on the data available to me, closed sociological surveys also show a trend of a significant decline in Zelenskyy’s presidential approval rating.

At the same time, according to all polls, Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains the frontrunner in the first round of a hypothetical presidential election.

In the second round of the presidential election (according to SOCIS), Volodymyr Zelenskyy trails all of his main rivals-Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, Kyrylo Budanov, and Mykhailo Fedorov. He could only defeat Petro Poroshenko in the second round of the presidential election. Closed opinion polls also confirm this trend.

It is telling that the polling group “Rating” does not publish data on a hypothetical second round of the presidential election.

Various opinion polls reveal a very paradoxical state of political sentiment among many Ukrainians. The overwhelming majority of respondents blame the government for the high level of corruption in the country, criticize Fedorov’s dismissal as defense minister, and, at the same time, a significant portion of these people retain their trust (albeit partial) in President Zelenskyy.

In my view, this is because most Ukrainians (whether a relative or absolute majority) accept Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a wartime leader. The “Fedorov incident” has not yet changed this situation. At the same time, however, an absolute majority of Ukrainians want a new president of Ukraine in the postwar period. A survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology revealed this as early as May 2026.

Before the “Fedorov incident,” there were three frontrunners in the hypothetical electoral race: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, and Kirill Budanov. Now, Mykhailo Fedorov has joined the group of potential frontrunners for the upcoming election; in hypothetical presidential races, he has moved into third place, trailing Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyy but ahead of Budanov. This is confirmed by all recent polls.

This quartet of potential frontrunners is also evident in simulations of the parliamentary elections. The hypothetical parties (electoral blocs) led by Zaluzhnyy, Zelenskyy, Fedorov, and Budanov are also in the lead in potential parliamentary races. Moreover, no single party has a chance of securing a majority on its own, and forming a future parliamentary majority will require at least three parties (electoral blocs).

Mykhailo Fedorov’s surge in the polls has made him one of the potential frontrunners in the upcoming elections, but it has not fundamentally changed either the current political situation or the configuration of the hypothetical electoral race. Zelenskyy remains among the frontrunners, and Fedorov has not become his main rival.

Most Ukrainians disapproved of Fedorov’s dismissal, but it did not decisively change their attitude toward President Zelenskyy or his actions and decisions. In a SOCIS poll, the response to the question “What do you consider to be the biggest mistakes of the current government?” is particularly telling. Respondents could select multiple answers. 60.2% of respondents cited “the persistence of high levels of corruption.” However, only a quarter of those surveyed (25.8%) cited Defense Minister Fedorov’s dismissal as one of the “biggest mistakes of the government.” And this response ranked only fourth. 

Various opinion polls (both public and private) show that Zaluzhnyy remains Zelenskyy’s main potential rival in the upcoming election. According to all opinion polls, he ranks second in the first round of the presidential election and would defeat Zelenskyy in the second round. Valery Zaluzhnyy also remains the leader in trust ratings across all polls. Zaluzhny’s hypothetical party (electoral bloc) is also the favorite in simulations of parliamentary elections.

This is an assessment of the poll standings as of early August 2026. Undoubtedly, political ratings will continue to fluctuate. The true balance of electoral forces will only become apparent when there is a real prospect of elections.

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