A Wave of Scandals Surrounding Zelenskyy's Team: What Political Consequences Will This Have?

It all began with the issue of removing Mykhailo Fedorov from his post as defense minister. And just when it seemed that this problem had been resolved (with the appointment of a new defense minister), the NABU special operation “Forrest Gump” began, a new corruption scandal emerged, one that implicated the Office of the President of Ukraine and, indirectly, Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. No sooner had the furor surrounding this issue subsided than a conflict involving gunfire erupted between SBU officers and personnel from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. And in the wake of this situation, NABU released details of its new investigation—“Carthage”—this time targeting senior officials in the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko himself came under fire.

One might think Zelenskyy should have gotten used to such problems by now. Starting in July of last year (the first “cardboard Maidan”) and, especially, after “Mindichgate” in November 2025 and Andriy Yermak’s resignation, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has weathered a whole series of such crises, learned to adapt to such situations, and developed a certain crisis management strategy. And despite significant damage to his reputation, these situational crises have not led to a collapse in his support or political influence.

But now the situation for the President of Ukraine looks much more problematic. Not only has he been grappling with a flurry of various political problems for nearly eight weeks, but an even more serious challenge has emerged: the trend of crisis situations has now spread to the security agencies on which Volodymyr Zelenskyy relies. And these are not merely the usual problems or scandals; they are manifestations of deep institutional crises within structures that are of fundamental importance both to the president himself and to the country amid a full-scale war.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Prosecutor General’s Office have long been “states” within a state—powerful and autonomous organizational structures with their own corporate rules, and even their own departmental and corporate identities. Military Intelligence (the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine), under the leadership of Kyrylo Budanov, has also become such a “state within a state” during the full-scale war with Russia. And it appears that the degree of their institutional autonomy has even increased. As for Zelenskyy, who had previously lacked sufficient control over them, he found that representatives of these intelligence agencies could act in their own interests and engage in open conflict with one another. Volodymyr Zelenskyy attempted to regain control over the intelligence agencies by replacing their leaders. But it turned out that this did not ensure reliable control. Moreover, Zelensky apparently wanted to exploit the personal and political rivalry between Kyrylo Budanov (former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate) and Oleksandr Poklad (current head of the Security Service of Ukraine in the capacity of “acting head”) for his own benefit. However, it was precisely their confrontation that may have served as the catalyst for the conflict between SBU and GUR personnel. And this conflict has not been fully resolved.

An even more serious problem for Volodymyr Zelenskyy is currently emerging with the Office of the Prosecutor General. An investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) exposed a criminal organization led by a high-ranking official in the Office of the Prosecutor General, which, according to the investigation, was involved in “protecting” a network of fraudulent call centers, as well as laundering the proceeds. A representative of the law enforcement system—which was supposed to prosecute the call centers—was in fact providing them with protection. And this is a very serious blow to the Prosecutor General’s Office. But the problem could become much bigger if Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko himself—who is named in the investigation’s materials—becomes a defendant in this case. If that happens, it will be a clear sign of an institutional crisis within the Office of the Prosecutor General and a political crisis surrounding that institution.

At the same time, it is important to understand that the problems facing the SBU and the Prosecutor General’s Office, which are leading to their institutional and political weakening, also weaken the President of Ukraine, who clearly relies on the SBU and the Office of the Prosecutor General to curb NABU investigations into members of the head of state’s inner circle.

The chain reaction of domestic political conflicts and scandals, which has been ongoing since mid-July, will undoubtedly have political consequences.

First, this represents a significant institutional weakening of President Zelenskyy. His monopolistic influence over the Ukrainian government is becoming increasingly precarious. As time goes on, the President of Ukraine will have fewer and fewer opportunities to resolve domestic political problems in a command-and-control style.

Second, all of this inevitably affects Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s image and reputation. There have already been some drops in his approval ratings, especially following the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov from his ministerial post. But the main problem for President Zelenskyy going forward is the accumulation of toxic political material surrounding his team, which will ultimately and inevitably work against him. It is only a matter of time and circumstances.

Interestingly, the maelstrom of political problems and scandals has affected not only Volodymyr Zelenskyy but also other political leaders who are viewed as potential frontrunners in the upcoming presidential election.

Kirill Budanov has faced the most negative consequences. His approval ratings have fallen, but the main problem is the NABU investigation codenamed “Forrest Gump,” in which the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine is implicated—albeit only indirectly so far. From a political standpoint, he risks losing his potential status as an independent political leader, as he has become part of—and, in a sense, a political “hostage” to—Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s team.

Mykhailo Fedorov has also been affected. The phenomenon of emotional swings was clearly evident in attitudes toward him. In the second half of July, following his dismissal as defense minister, there was a frenzied surge of attention and respect for Mykhailo Fedorov, and his approval ratings soared. But by the end of August, he faced a cold shower of criticism for ill-considered statements and actions, particularly for calling for a discussion about elections during wartime. The former defense minister’s political impatience regularly leads to missteps in his activities. Another problem has emerged: opposition-minded politicians and citizens do not view Mykhailo Fedorov as a true opposition figure; to them, he remains a member of Zelenskyy’s team. 

The only representative of the group of frontrunners in the hypothetical presidential race who has remained untouched by recent political conflicts and scandals is Valeriy Zaluzhny. Of course, this is due to the fact that, as Ukraine’s ambassador, he does not participate in the country’s domestic political life and is not as active in the media as Mykhailo Fedorov. Nevertheless, Ukrainians have not forgotten Valery Fedorovich. He remains the leader in trust ratings. And most potential voters see him as the main alternative to Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

But Zaluzhnyy hasn’t been forgotten by his opponents either, especially those in Bankova Street. If there are no real problems, then they have to be invented. So they spread a fake story about a meeting with Stolar, who is a defendant in the “Forest Gump” case, and then released a satirical video by “95th Quarter” targeting the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is yet another political blunder by the “Quarter” crew, especially against the backdrop of the current corruption scandals. It won’t be long before a “corruption quarter” meme emerges (both literally and figuratively). As for the political attacks on Zaluzhny, they actually have the opposite effect—they reveal exactly who those in power on Bankova Street perceive as their main rival.

In reality, the presidential team’s political strategists should now be focusing not on attacking potential rivals, but on the need for an informational and political crisis response. The storylines of “Forrest Gump” and “Carthage” are still unfolding. New figures may emerge in new corruption scandals, and new challenges may arise for President Zelenskyy.

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