We must not respond to Ukrainophobia with Polonophobia

At the time, one of the fundamental ideas behind the creation of the State of Israel was precisely that Jews should have their own state capable of protecting them.

But Israel did not limit itself to combating anti-Semitism around the world. It created the conditions for aliyah—the return of Jews to their homeland. For those who return, there are mechanisms in place for adaptation, language learning, social support, employment, and integration into society.

What should we, as Ukrainians, do?

How can we protect the millions of Ukrainian war refugees? How can we support the Ukrainian diaspora? How can we not forget about Ukrainians who have lived for generations beyond Ukraine’s current borders, in the lands where they, their parents, and their grandparents were born?

That is precisely why, at the time, I introduced a bill on demographic policy, in which I proposed mechanisms for such a state policy. But the bill has not yet been adopted.

It’s much easier to stir up anti-Polish hysteria in Ukrainian society.

Here, for example, are two posts on Telegram channels that essentially cover the same event.

In one, “Poles brutally beat up Ukrainians”; the comments are already talking about broken arms.

In the other version, a drunk Pole, mistaking two Poles for Ukrainians, started a fight with them.

You have to admit, these are completely different stories.

But the very possibility of such a conflict certainly indicates that the problem of hostility toward Ukrainians exists and cannot be ignored.

Does this mean that the entire Polish society has become anti-Ukrainian? No.

Poles continue to support Ukraine and Ukrainians. Polish businesses are interested in hiring Ukrainians. Polish local governments—such as in Sopot—are adopting statements against anti-Ukrainian sentiment and in defense of Ukrainians. The Polish government and police must investigate every crime committed against Ukrainians, and we must demand this of them.

But that’s not enough.

The main question is: what should we ourselves do?

We must build a strong Ukrainian state that will show both the long-standing Ukrainian diaspora and today’s war refugees that this state exists, in part, to protect you.

If a Ukrainian cannot be protected where he is today, he must know: Ukraine is waiting for him.

That upon returning, they will have the opportunity to find housing and work, social support, and, if necessary, Ukrainian language courses and assistance in adapting to Ukrainian society.

The Ukrainian state must care for Ukrainians around the world. Today, unfortunately, we do not have a systematic state policy of this scale.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine remain the greatest guarantee that Ukraine will have a future at all. For it is they who are defending both our state and Ukrainians today.

And what should our policy toward other countries be?

Pragmatic.

We must proceed from Ukraine’s national interests.

Is it in Ukraine’s interest today to be at odds with Poland?

Isn’t Russia’s war against Ukraine and the constant threat to our Black Sea ports enough for us?

Do we want to jeopardize the western routes used to transport weapons, goods, and humanitarian aid—and along which millions of our citizens travel?

Do we want to gain yet another adversary within the European Union and NATO—instead of a country that supports Ukraine?

Of course not.

Ukraine is interested in Poland as a friend. In Poland as a partner. In the best possible Ukrainian-Polish relations.

This in no way means that we should remain silent about crimes against Ukrainians. On the contrary—every Ukrainian must be protected, and we must demand that the Polish state conduct a fair investigation into every case of violence or discrimination.

We must support those Poles—politicians, civic leaders, and local government officials—who speak out against anti-Ukrainian sentiment. And we must do everything possible to ensure that political forces and sentiments based on hatred toward Ukrainians do not prevail in Poland, because stoking hostility between Poles and Ukrainians objectively plays into Russia’s hands.

But that is precisely why we must not respond to anti-Ukrainian sentiment with anti-Polish sentiment.

Our response to anti-Ukrainian hysteria cannot be anti-Polish hysteria.

Our response must be a strong Ukrainian state that protects its people around the world, creates conditions for their return home, and at the same time pragmatically builds alliances with those states on which our security depends.

And Poland is one of the most important among these nations.

Ukraine needs a strong Poland as a friend. Poland needs a strong Ukraine as a friend.

And Russia is the one that stands to gain the most from our mutual hatred.

We shouldn’t give it such a gift.

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