Here are seven criteria for assessing the wisdom of Fedorov’s opposition to Zelenskyy

Of course, all of these criteria relate exclusively to resisting Russian aggression.

1. In a war of attrition, we must strive to achieve the most favorable casualty ratio possible. This must be a repeatedly articulated goal—both public and private—a criterion for the success of all operations at every level, starting with the tactical level, and a criterion for the success of all reforms, both small and large.

2. A fair distribution of the burden of military service among citizens. Is a particular leadership capable of solving the problem of staffing military units and replacing those who have already served for five years with those who have never served a single day?

3. Ensuring the rule of law in the military. Both democratic and undemocratic militaries have something we lack—a system of military justice. This is largely an independent chain of command that monitors legality within the military, ensures the rights of service members are upheld, and has the ability to respond quickly and competently to violations, resolving them promptly at minimal cost.

4. Personnel reform in the military. Currently, the administrative staff in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is bloated; there are far too many individuals in high-ranking positions with long service records but little competence in modern high-tech warfare. Consequently, it is essentially grassroots groups of enthusiasts who are fighting using semi-legal methods, while the top brass pretends to be in charge, even though, in reality, they are more of a hindrance. This must change.

5. Logistics. We need to examine what percentage of ACTUALLY FUNCTIONING weapons, equipment, and vehicles is provided by the state, rather than by volunteers. I don’t know if such studies have been conducted, but the figures would be quite interesting—it would turn out that a much larger percentage of the war is being fought by the people than officials imagine. Pickup trucks, ATVs, computers, daily necessities—is the Ministry of Defense even involved at all? Five years into the war?

6. Every winter, we see that we’re not fully prepared for winter. We need emergency (alternative) sources of heat and electricity. It’s not hard to come up with a list of transparent indicators showing how prepared we are for winter shelling, nor is it hard to monitor them.

7. Furthermore, we constantly face logistical crises at the borders: blockades at sea, in Poland, and damaged bridges and crossings. For example, we did not prepare for the current blockade of the southern ports as quickly as we would have liked. The criterion is how successfully policymakers are completing new transportation corridors and strengthening existing ones.

You can keep these seven criteria in mind and assess whether the current political competition is helping to resolve them or not. The rest of the agenda, in my view, is just nonsense and confusion in the minds of people who are out of touch with reality.

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