Putin is heading toward the biggest disappointment of his life

Without humiliating an enemy who has even dared to put up such fierce resistance, victory will not be a victory for him. At the same time, it would be a humiliation for the West, which has proven incapable of standing up to the Kremlin’s whims. It’s worth giving everything for this. How close he is to achieving these goals—judge for yourselves.

Ukraine is striving to create a situation in which Putin would be forced to end the war due to circumstances he finds unsatisfactory. Exactly what he would consider such circumstances—and when—no one knows. In reality, Russia has long since driven itself into a deep hole, and it’s completely unclear how or how long it will take to climb out—even if the war ends tomorrow. But it won’t end tomorrow, and the descent into even greater depths will likely continue, perhaps at an accelerated pace. From this “defeatist” point of view, the plunge into the abyss should have been halted the day before yesterday, but the tsar has become utterly obsessed with playing with toy soldiers; there’s no pulling him away from it. “Any moment now,” he has convinced himself—and continues to convince others—Ukraine will tremble and crumble; all that’s needed is to step up the strikes and throw more cannon fodder into the fray. Our shortage of anti-ballistic weapons seems to be whispering in his ear: “Keep going, keep going!”

No year has been tougher for Putin’s Russia than 2026, but it’s impossible to abandon those cherished goals—which, in his view, are within arm’s reach—especially since the population under his control shows no signs of growing discontent. Fatigue from the senselessly protracted “special military operation”—yes, it’s evident—but who fears the weary? Putin has always treated the broad masses with contempt, and his own people above all—and it must be said, they gave him reason to do so. Ukrainians have consistently fallen outside this picture of social order, created by the meager imagination of a KGB officer, constantly presenting the Kremlin with intractable challenges, as was the case in 2004, 2014, and continuously since 2022. Now, in the summer of 2026, amid the regular barrage of missiles and the prospect of yet another harsh winter, there is no sign of any shift in sentiment in Ukraine that might inspire the “liberators.”

A recent KIIS poll (late July–early August) showed that 61% of Ukrainians are prepared to endure the war for as long as necessary. This is a significant increase compared to April, when 48% gave that response. In Kyiv, which has borne the full brunt of the rocket attacks, the figure rose from 61% to 69%. In April, there may have been greater uncertainty regarding the war’s future course, which fueled expectations for a swift end and, consequently, narrowed the horizon of patience. Currently, only 16% believe the war will end in the fall or winter of 2026, 15% believe it will end in the first half of 2027, and the majority, 45%, expect it to end in the second half of 2027 or later. Some people’s illusions have been dispelled: while in April 29% said they were willing to endure the war for up to six months, that figure has now dropped to 20%, with the difference shifting toward the “long-suffering” group.

At this stage, the war particularly clearly demonstrates the constant superiority of offensive capabilities over defensive ones. Offensive capabilities develop faster, are generally cheaper, and are deployed more flexibly than defensive ones, thus allowing for the pursuit of the initiative and strategic advantage. Both Russia and Ukraine will strike more frequently and with greater force in their quest to seize this advantage, and repelling these strikes will be equally difficult. Technology reigns supreme, and after yet another grueling phase of the war, it will inevitably tip the scales in favor of those who need it most and who have stronger, more resourceful partners. And that certainly isn’t Russia. Another disappointment awaits them—the greatest they have ever experienced.