Russia has no obvious military or political reasons to step up its mobilization

1. Mobilization in Russia was announced on September 21, 2022—at a critical moment when, following a successful Ukrainian operation to liberate the Kharkiv region, the Russian army was on the brink of defeat. To save the situation from disaster, Putin declared mobilization.

Today, the Russian army is far from the catastrophic state it was in during the fall of 2022. It continues, albeit slowly, to advance. Putin repeats almost daily that “our guys are advancing every day.” Therefore, it can be said that the conditions that forced Putin to order a mobilization four years ago are currently absent.

2. It’s reasonable to assume that intensifying mobilization will allow Russia to accelerate its advance. However, as Valeriy Zaluzhnyy consistently points out, given the current level of technology, a breakthrough on the front remains unlikely—and this issue cannot be resolved simply by increasing troop numbers.

A breakthrough requires weapons, equipment, ammunition, air defense systems, and so on. But first and foremost—the return of armored vehicles to the front. However, due to the high density of various reconnaissance assets, the front line remains completely transparent to both sides. Any equipment is quickly detected and destroyed. The result is what Zaluzhny calls a “stalemate,” from which a way out is possible only through a technological breakthrough.

The Russian offensive is progressing slowly precisely because it is based on the tactic of foot infiltration, carried out on foot by small groups attempting to remain undetected. Increasing the number of assault troops is unlikely to lead to a significant acceleration of the offensive. It is more likely that this would only increase Russian casualties or slightly enhance their ability to repel Ukrainian counterattacks.

Theoretically, the Russians could open a new front. But establishing a new operational direction requires not just hundreds of thousands of infantrymen, but the formation of new, fully-fledged units equipped with heavy machinery, scarce air defense systems, artillery, and—most importantly—experienced commanders and staff. Currently, all operationally capable Russian officers are already deployed on the Ukrainian front, and to stretch Ukrainian forces—as is currently happening in the north of the Kharkiv and Sumy regions—mobilization is not necessary at all.

3. But a separate question arises: Does Putin even need to accelerate the offensive?

Russia is waging a war of attrition. In such a war, the speed of advance and the pace of territorial gains are not critical. A slow advance, combined with airstrikes on Ukrainian rear areas, is designed to ensure that Ukraine exhausts its resources, European allies withdraw their support, and Ukrainian society breaks down and demands that the government surrender.

Putin is convinced that he can win a war of attrition. That is precisely why he is dragging out the negotiation process and continuing military operations, intensifying strikes on Ukrainian cities. At the same time, it is clear that the main offensive is planned for the winter season, and it is unlikely that the coming winter will be any easier for Ukraine than the previous one.

This tactic does not require increased mobilization. Russia is currently continuing to recruit about 30,000 contract soldiers each month. Despite heavy losses during offensive operations, this allows it to continue increasing the size of its forces. At least, this is what former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi noted in one of his interviews in June.

4. Thus, a straightforward analysis shows that Russia has no obvious military or political reasons to intensify mobilization. The Russian army is not on the brink of disaster; it is slowly advancing along its main axis with the aim of capturing Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. News from Ukraine about the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Minister of Defense, along with regular attacks on representatives of the Joint Forces Operation, demonstrate to the Kremlin that there are signs of a governance crisis within the Ukrainian government, and that a segment of society is ready to engage in conflict with its own military rather than fight the Russian army.

However, when analyzing the reality, we must not forget the main point: in a totalitarian country, any decisions are made not on the basis of rational military or political calculations, but solely as a result of the irrational phobias and pathological ambitions of a single person in the Kremlin. The full-scale invasion in 2022 also lacked any rational political or military logic. And that is precisely why Ukraine, if it seeks to preserve its statehood, must be prepared for absolutely any scenario, even if it seems the least likely to us today.

Source