Cyberattacks, acts of sabotage, and provocations: How Russia Might Test NATO’s Resilience, and How Europe Is Prepared to Respond

Russia is the main source of this threat. Western intelligence agencies consistently warn that Moscow is building up its military capabilities and is already resorting to various tactics, such as cyberattacks and provocations against NATO countries.

“Shelter” examined how prepared Europe is for a real war and how Russia is already testing NATO’s resilience.

What kind of war is Europe preparing for? 

Western intelligence agencies view 2030 as the deadline by which Russia could restore its capabilities and launch a war against NATO. Until then, alliance member countries face a test of their resilience. The Guardian, citing Western intelligence sources, reports on the risk of Russian provocations against the Baltic states or Poland. One scenario involves an “operation under a false flag.”

Military expert Oleg Zhdanov believes this is a entirely realistic scenario, and countries directly facing the Russian threat are now preparing much more actively for a possible escalation: they are strengthening their armies, defenses, and security measures, and their intelligence services are working more actively. At the same time, in Central and especially Southern Europe, awareness of this threat is significantly lower. There, you still hear people say that the war is taking place in Ukraine and does not directly concern them.

“The Russian Federation is using every opportunity to destabilize the situation and plunge Europe into chaos and instability. Therefore, an operation under a false flag is entirely plausible today. I would highlight three potential flashpoints: Finland, Russia’s border with the Baltic states, and the Belarusian border,” says Zhdanov.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas told Reuters that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are already stepping up security for critical infrastructure: dams, power plants, gas facilities, and other strategic infrastructure.

“We are not naive; we see the information, read between the lines, and do our job. The likelihood of a potential hybrid threat is higher than before. We are making it clear that we will defend ourselves if necessary,” Kaunas told Reuters.

According to Zhdanov, this is exactly what Russia will try to do—test countries’ responses to provocations. This does not necessarily mean seizing territory; it could be a short-term raid. For example, a group enters the territory of a NATO country, carries out several terrorist attacks or acts of sabotage, and then withdraws. For Putin, this could be a way to test how NATO’s mechanisms—primarily Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—would function in practice. The calculation may be that the allies will limit themselves to consultations under Article 4, or that they will “fight among themselves” and break up into separate factions. 

In March of this year, the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) conducted a separate study on Russian sabotage operations against civilian infrastructure and logistics in NATO countries. Experts identified transportation routes, railways, and the infrastructure necessary for the rapid redeployment of forces to the eastern flank as key vulnerabilities.

How will this war differ from a conventional one?

The war for which Europe is preparing today is very different from the one Western armies have been preparing for over decades.

Valeriy Zaluzhny, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and now Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, describes the coming war as multi-domain. According to him, modern warfare will unfold across vast digital battlefields where robotic systems and robots will operate.

“To be prepared for such a war, we must now have capabilities across five domains: on the water and underwater, on land, in the air, in space, and in the digital realm, including cybersecurity,” Zaluzhny writes.

Military experts explain that, for example, drones have partially taken over the functions of artillery and aviation, electronic warfare systems have rendered conventional satellite navigation unreliable, and software, artificial intelligence, and data transmission speeds now determine who will spot a target first and be able to strike it in time.

That is precisely why the question for NATO today is no longer just how many tanks, aircraft, or artillery systems the Alliance can deploy in the event of a war with Russia. Rather, it is whether these forces are capable of operating under conditions where military units, satellite communications, logistics routes, energy infrastructure, information systems, and critical infrastructure are all under simultaneous attack.

According to her, European partners recognize the decisive role of drones in Ukraine’s defense, yet when rearming their own armies, they still rely heavily on traditional, expensive systems: missiles, fighter jets, and other conventional weapons. This is despite the fact that the experience of the war in Ukraine has shown that the very principles of warfare have changed, and the drone threat from Russia is no longer relevant only to Ukraine.

That is precisely why, according to Mykhalko, European countries should more actively integrate Ukraine’s combat and technological expertise: cooperate with the Ukrainian defense industry, localize the production of unmanned systems, and build up capabilities in the field of reconnaissance drones and interceptor drones.

However, RUSI emphasizes that NATO should not oversimplify the study of Ukraine’s experience. RUSI researcher Jack Watling noted that the improvement in the situation for Ukrainian units is linked not so much to an increase in the number of drones as to better integration of drones, infantry, artillery, and other assets.

In his assessment, Ukraine is increasingly shifting toward a comprehensive, combined-arms approach that integrates drones, infantry, artillery, and other assets into a single system. Military experts say that the lesson of the war for NATO lies not in the formula “drones instead of tanks,” but in the ability to combine unmanned systems, artillery, aviation, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and digital command and control into a single combat loop.

Allied Provocations and Ukraine’s Place in the European Defense Industry?

A CSIS study notes that Russia has identified unmanned systems and artificial intelligence as strategic technological priorities and is gradually developing systems with more autonomous decision-making capabilities.

Experts also note that after 2022, the Russian defense industry restructured itself specifically to meet the demands of a protracted war. Companies are producing not only armored vehicles and missiles but also air defense systems, electronic warfare systems, precision-guided weapons, and drones.

Mykola Sungurovsky, director of military programs at the Razumkov Center, points out that despite its rearmament, Europe remains dependent on the United States, and therefore its security is impossible without continued support from Washington.

“Europe’s dependence on the U.S. today consists of hundreds of components: from intelligence data and parts to air-to-surface missile systems, satellite capabilities, and data transmission systems. Dependence on specific technologies and components also remains critical; a shortage of these could halt entire weapons production chains,” explains Sungurovsky.

The expert also points out that Russia will act in a comprehensive manner, rather than following a single scenario. It will seek out Europe’s vulnerabilities and create them itself, using the resources and influence it already possesses within European countries: political influence, the export of corruption, dependence on cheap energy sources, and the financing of loyal political forces.

Foreign intelligence agencies also suggest that Russia will attempt to sow discord among allies. Lithuanian intelligence reports that Moscow may use Ukrainian drones for provocations in the Baltic states. However, military experts note that allies can easily trace such actions back to Russia.

Oleg Zhdanov explains that a drone’s origin and route can be determined from its wreckage. In addition, there is currently a fairly high level of intelligence regarding the use of drones, particularly when Ukrainian drones are operating near the borders of Belarus or the Baltic states.

“Determining where a specific drone came from and what its route was is not a major problem. Furthermore, the United States has significant capabilities for satellite reconnaissance and surveillance of Ukrainian territory. Therefore, I have no doubt that U.S. intelligence can track the flight paths of Ukrainian drones. It can also detect when a drone is affected by electronic warfare measures, deviates from its intended route, or crashes. “In other words, it is technically entirely possible to trace a drone’s route and determine the circumstances of such an incident,” explains Zhdanov.

The experts interviewed say that, in general, Europe understands that its security is impossible without Ukraine’s participation, as the Ukrainian military has significantly more experience in actual warfare than the military forces of NATO member states. A few years ago, the EU involved Ukraine in developing a strategy for the European defense industry, in which Ukrainian companies are also participating. And in July of this year, the EU and Ukraine launched a new defense-industrial partnership and the EU-Ukraine Drone Deal. At the same time, the European Commission allocated an additional 1 billion euros for Ukrainian drone capabilities. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has repeatedly stated that the goal for the coming years is to integrate Ukraine’s defense economy by harmonizing standards, procurement rules, and intellectual property protection, as well as by establishing joint ventures.

However, military experts point out the weaknesses of European politicians: slowness, bureaucracy, and pandering to the sentiments of their electorate. 

“Europeans have finally realized that Russia is indeed a threat. But not everyone has come to their senses yet. Intelligence agencies provide the political leadership of major European countries with fairly clear assessments, but the response so far does not fully match either the scale or the nature of this threat. Politically, NATO countries are limited in their ability to act as intelligence assessments require, because governments are forced to take into account the sentiments of their electorate. And it is not only the governments of these countries that are working with this electorate; Russia is also actively working with it,” Sungurovsky concludes.