Cornered Putin: Why he needs the State Duma elections

"Shelter" analyzed what the Kremlin is actually planning, what the Russian elite and society expect from these elections, and how confident the Russian authorities are in their own stability.

Why does Russia hold parliamentary elections?

The last State Duma elections took place in September 2021. Since terms last five years, the next election to renew the Duma’s membership will take place in just two weeks, and the results will be announced no later than October 5.

It is clear that in Russia, for decades now, any election has turned into an “election without a choice”; so looking for an expression of the people’s will in them is ridiculous, since the purpose of every election—including the upcoming State Duma election—is for Russian dictator Vladimir Putin to test how firmly he still controls the system.

“For Putin, elections are purely a Kremlin toy. No serious person takes them as a matter of life and death. The opposition needs something to keep itself occupied, and the Kremlin needs to create the appearance of a political struggle. This has nothing to do with the actual decision-making process,” explains Ilya Ponomarev, a Russian opposition figure and former State Duma deputy, to “Shelter.”

At the same time, he says, this does not mean that the Kremlin is not interested in the voting results at all.

“Specific figures are important to many people within the system because they demonstrate their effectiveness, resilience, and the extent to which they control the elites in the regions. That is why there is a certain struggle surrounding these indicators,” says Ponomarev.

At the same time, in his opinion, the very configuration of the future State Duma does not fundamentally change anything for the Kremlin.

Since all participating parties support the war, the distribution of seats among them will not fundamentally alter the country’s political course.

Separately, Ponomarev draws attention to the Russian electoral system: half of the State Duma deputies are elected from party lists, while the other half are elected in single-member districts.

“But the system of access to funding and the media is structured in such a way that it is practically impossible for an opposition candidate to win in a single-member district. And where such a possibility does arise, the candidate is simply removed from the ballot,” Ponomarev explains.

Therefore, he says, even before the vote on party lists, United Russia can effectively count on securing the vast majority of seats in the State Duma. And the percentage it receives through the party lists—whether 35%, 45%, or 55%—will not fundamentally change the balance of power in parliament.

“From the perspective of the State Duma’s final composition, this doesn’t matter much. United Russia will still have a huge advantage. Therefore, the battle for percentage points on the party lists is more of a vanity fair,” says Ponomarev.

Why was the Yabloko party excluded?

The only potential source of intrigue in the election could have been the participation of the Yabloko party. It is one of the oldest liberal parties, founded back in 1993 by Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin. Today, the party is led by Nikolai Rybakov, while its founder, Grigory Yavlinsky, remains the head of the Federal Political Committee and one of the party’s key figures.

Yabloko is effectively the only legal party that publicly opposed the war and ran in the election under the slogan: “For peace and freedom! For a life without fear!”

At first, they were even allowed to participate in the election. Young people began to actively support the party, and the opposition, which had left the country, campaigned for people to vote for Yabloko. And on August 18, as expected, the party was removed from the election.     

Russian opposition politician and former State Duma deputy Dmitry Gudkov, in a comment to “Shelter,” expressed the view that the Kremlin decided to remove Yabloko from the election not because of the party’s high approval rating.

As Gudkov points out, the party’s electoral list was rather weak: it consisted mainly of little-known regional politicians and new activists, and the political force itself had not demonstrated strong electoral results over the past decades.

However, this time the situation could have been different. According to Gudkov, because of the war, the parliamentary elections could effectively have turned into a kind of referendum for some Russians on a single issue: whether they support the war or oppose it.

It is precisely under these conditions that Yabloko could unexpectedly receive significantly more support than the party’s actual poll numbers suggest.

“The Yabloko Party could suddenly have become the sole force around which everyone would unite. An anti-war stance could have translated into a large percentage of votes for Yabloko.” Not because that would be the party’s own achievement, but because it would have become a form of protest voting. There would have been a place to check a box if you were against Putin and against the war,” says Gudkov.

Ponomarev agrees that Yabloko, in and of itself, poses no threat to the Russian regime. However, he explains the reason for the party’s exclusion from the election somewhat differently than Gudkov.

According to him, the relationship between the party’s founder, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Putin plays an important role. Ponomarev believes that this is precisely what has allowed the party to remain within the legal framework for many years, despite the de facto destruction of systemic political competition in Russia.

“Putin is on good terms with Yavlinsky, and that’s why he doesn’t let his ‘minions’ (subordinates—ed.) completely crush this party. But allowing it to exist doesn’t mean letting it into parliament,” he says.

The problem, according to Ponomarev, is not that a small Yabloko faction could pose a threat to Putin’s rule. It could create another, much smaller—but unwelcome—problem for the Kremlin: disrupting the State Duma’s complete unanimity on issues of war and foreign policy.

In the Russian parliament, Ponomarev notes, debates on socioeconomic policy and criticism of the government, the prime minister, or individual ministers are permitted. Deputies can discuss draft legislation. But there is one area where the Kremlin absolutely requires complete unity.

“Putin does not tolerate differences of opinion on matters of war and peace—that is, on matters of foreign policy strategy. And in this sense, Yabloko posed a threat. Not a threat to the regime, but a threat to political management. People could have appeared in the Duma who would say the wrong thing, vote the wrong way, fail to toe the line, and disrupt the overall picture,” Ponomarev noted.

In his opinion, Yabloko did indeed have a chance of clearing the electoral threshold. Especially in large cities, the party could have received 5–7% of the vote and formed a small faction in the State Duma.

“No matter how timid they may be, the most outspoken members of Yabloko have already either been put behind bars or barred from the election due to various legal statuses. But who knows—anything could happen. No one in the bureaucracy wants to be held accountable for this later. So it was easier to just shut down the party,” says Ponomarev.

Gudkov says this could have been a large-scale, legal, and at the same time anti-war campaign lasting six weeks. The Kremlin decided it was dangerous and simply unnecessary, so Yabloko was disbanded.

What is happening in Russian society?

Russian society remains divided in its attitude toward the war. According to the latest Levada Center poll, support for the Russian army’s actions remained high in August, but six out of ten respondents already favor a transition to peace talks, while about one-third support continuing hostilities.

The difference is particularly noticeable among young people: among Russians under 24, support for the Russian army’s actions stands at 48%. At the same time, 57% of Russians describe the political situation in the country as tense, and the respondents themselves cite the war, instability, and fear for the future as the reasons for this state of affairs.

A recent and unexpected wave of discontent among people who can hardly be called part of the Russian opposition has been particularly telling.

In the spring, blogger Viktoria Bonya recorded a nearly 20-minute address to Putin “on behalf of the people.” She spoke about problems in the country, internet restrictions, and business challenges, and stated that governors and officials are afraid to tell the president the truth. The video garnered over 20 million views and a million likes. Even the Kremlin responded to it.

Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, confirmed that they had seen the message and taken note of the issues raised by Bonya. At the same time, the blogger herself did not switch to an opposition stance and continued to express her support for Putin.

Ponomarev emphasized that the Kremlin monitors statements made by well-known figures with audiences in the millions, even if they do not belong to the political opposition. Such appeals can serve as a way to convey public sentiment to Putin without entering into direct confrontation with him.

“The sentiments of Russia’s elites are quite clear: this war issue has become tiresome; it leads nowhere; it’s dangerous and could end very sadly. But everyone understands that one person makes the decisions. And it’s essential that reports—in folders on his desk—reach this person that could nudge him in a certain direction,” Ponomarev emphasized.

According to him, such attempts within the system occur in waves. At first, they tried to show Putin the problems in the economy, which were discussed, in particular, by German Gref (chairman of the board of Sberbank—ed.) and Elvira Nabiullina (chairwoman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation—ed.). Then signals began to emerge about public fatigue, even from representatives of the “Z-circle.”

However, according to Russian opposition politician Dmitry Gudkov, public fatigue and economic problems do not yet mean that the Kremlin is preparing to end the war. On the contrary, after the parliamentary elections, Putin will have more leeway for further escalation.

“The election is coming up, so he needs to keep talking about victories all the time. Putin always talks about victories—there’s nothing new here. But once the election is over, he will, of course, have carte blanche for further escalation,” says Gudkov.

Ukrainian journalist and columnist Vitaly Portnikov, speaking on the program “Greater Lviv Speaks ,” attributes the emergence of discontent among Russians to the fact that, for a significant portion of Russian society, the war becomes a problem only when its consequences reach Russia directly.

“I worked in Russia for many years during the Chechen wars, and I can say from my own experience: as soon as the war reaches Russia directly, people develop anti-war sentiments. They don’t want there to be a war in Russia. They may be indifferent until it affects them personally. And when it does, they simply want it to stop,” Portnikov noted.

This is precisely how he explains the potential support for Yabloko. According to the journalist, this isn’t necessarily about solidarity with Ukraine or a principled rejection of war. Some Russians may want it to end because the consequences of the fighting are increasingly disrupting their own lives.