Drapatyi's First Month: What He Has Already Changed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and What to Expect Next

A month is too short a time to evaluate the new commander-in-chief based on specific changes on the front lines, but his leadership priorities are already becoming clear. During this time, Drapatyi has carried out his first personnel reshuffles, begun reviewing the principles for staffing individual units, emphasized the autonomy of army corps, and changed approaches to mobilization.

“Shelter” spoke with military experts and active-duty service members and asked them to assess Mykhailo Drapatyi’s first month as commander-in-chief.

First Personnel Decisions: Drapatyi Forms His Team

“Today, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi, assumed his duties—changes have already taken place. Together with Mykhailo Drapatyi and Yevhen Khmara, it was decided that Ihor Skybyuk will become the new Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—that decision has also already been made. They are seasoned combat veterans. The troops know them—Drapatyi, Khmara, and Skibyuk,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a month ago in his video address.

Drapatyi’s appointment has been met with approval from all sides: his combat experience and reputation command respect among both the military and the general public, including participants in the “cardboard protests.”

Traditionally, a new appointment begins with forming one’s own team and a personnel shake-up. With Drapatyi’s arrival, the chief of staff to the deputy commander of the Ground Forces, Oleksandr Gruzevych, was dismissed almost immediately. In the Logistics Forces, Volodymyr Karpenko was replaced by Yuriy Pogribny. Andriy Malinovsky, Commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery, was recalled from a business trip to the General Staff to resume his primary position, while the dismissal of Shamil Krutkov, commander of the 93rd Brigade—a process initiated under Syrskyi—was rescinded, and he was allowed to remain in command of the brigade.

On August 17, after speaking with Drapatyi, Zelenskyy announced that personnel decisions were being prepared to reinforce the most intense sectors of the front. “I have approved the first batch of personnel appointments that we discussed with Mykhailo Drapatyi. Five decisions have already been made, and more are to come,” the president noted. The next reshuffles are expected at the level of corps and troop group commanders, primarily on the Sloviansk, Kostiantynivka, and Pokrovsk sectors.

However, in a conversation with “Shelter,” the interviewees pointed out that, compared to Syrsky, Drapatyi does not have the same freedom of action, as personnel changes are proceeding sluggishly and slowly; as of today, the president has not yet signed any of the dismissals submitted by Drapatyi, and some of the new appointees are still serving in an acting capacity (TVO—editor’s note).

“He’s supposedly the commander-in-chief, but he can’t appoint anyone to key positions: all general ranks, all posts in the General Staff, or the commanders of the military branches. In other words, it’s the supreme commander-in-chief—Zelenskyy—who appoints and dismisses them. We need to understand whether the president has actually entrusted the army to him or only nominally. Because right now, it seems as though you’re in charge, but you’re not,” says Hennadiy Druzenko, a lawyer and co-founder of the first Mykola Pirogov Volunteer Mobile Hospital.

He notes that there is still confusion and uncertainty regarding personnel appointments, which does not serve the state’s interests. Druzenko also points out that, despite several appointments, some of the candidates’ appointments have still not been signed.

“As for the Medical Forces, which I’m more familiar with, Anatoliy Kazmirchuk seems to have been dismissed, but we, again, don’t see who’s replacing him. We know that some of the nominations Drapatyi has already made haven’t been approved by the president. And that’s very strange. Because when you appoint a new person to such a position, that person is essentially the one who has to lead the war, and you have to give them full carte blanche—and, accordingly, hold them accountable for results. So the question here is: Is this a free hand from the president, or is it more of a political game, a political maneuver to defuse the negative sentiment that has built up around Syrskyi and replace him with a popular military figure—but one without real authority? That remains an open question for now,” says Druzenko.

Military analyst Vasyl Pekhno generally views the personnel changes initiated by Mykhailo Drapatyi positively. Specifically, these include the appointment of new leadership in certain areas, changes in the command of the Logistics Forces, and the promotion of military personnel who previously held secondary positions. At the same time, the limited personnel pool is becoming the main challenge for the new commander-in-chief.

“We’re currently facing a situation in the military that’s been developing over the past few years—there’s a shortage of personnel. In some areas where veteran personnel were removed, a vacuum is now forming—there aren’t enough people to fill those roles. We may even see some of the veteran personnel return to certain positions,” the expert notes.

In his view, the problem has been building up over the past few years: some promising commanders who could potentially have vied for the highest positions were sidelined into less prominent roles.

“During Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi’s tenure, a great many people who could potentially—including Drapatyi himself—have competed with the commander-in-chief were, so to speak, somewhat sidelined and pushed aside. That is why we now need to somewhat replenish the personnel reserve in our army,” Pechno believes.

Druzenko notes that at the time, Syrskyi had complete “free rein,” and he removed everyone—all the way down to colonels—who had worked with Zaluzhnyi.

“Syrsky wasn’t a rival in the polls, so he had carte blanche—from creating regiments the size of corps to turning a blind eye to various irregularities. If Drapatyi really does have that kind of free rein, then I hope we have a chance at a very good outcome on the front lines. So far, I don’t see anything even close to that kind of free rein,” says Druzenko.

Yuriy Fedorenko, the combat commander of “Achilles,” calls Drapatyi a general of the modern generation and of the future Ukrainian army. According to him, Drapatyi sees a vast, broad scope for the reforms that must take place in the Ukrainian army. Regarding personnel policy, Fedorenko does not believe that Drapatyi faces any restrictions; rather, he enjoys the full trust of everyone.

“There are key areas where personnel changes have already taken place. A team that knows how to get the job done has taken over, including in top positions. At all other levels, you will see phased and systematic personnel changes where they are truly needed. In particular, there may be some high-profile personnel decisions. The policy advocated by the commander-in-chief is to appoint not just convenient candidates, but effective and progressive professionals,” says Fedorenko.

“In General Drapatyi’s case, you don’t need to have any connections or someone to put in a good word for you. It’s enough to be an effective soldier, sergeant, or officer, to do your job well, and you can qualify for a higher position and take on greater responsibility. This is very important,” he adds.

New Approaches and New Hope for the Troops

The commander of the Third Army Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Maksym Zhorin of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, says it is still too early to evaluate Mykhailo Drapatyi’s performance, as it is very difficult to prove oneself and implement any plans or decisions in such a short period of time.

“We can already see certain personnel changes, which are entirely logical for a new leader, but we can only evaluate them later. The main thing I’d highlight is that a more equitable approach to the allocation of resources and personnel is already evident. There’s also an initiative to change the very approach to deploying personnel—moving toward a more technology-driven approach, first and foremost,” says Zhorin.

According to him, it is important to see how the situation will develop going forward. Will everything be implemented? Will there be effective cooperation with the Minister of Defense, as well as with the commanders of corps and individual units? And to what extent will there be a fundamental rethinking of the overall principle of deploying troops on the battlefield?

Drapatiy identified the further development of the corps system and an increase in the autonomy of the corps as a separate area of focus. The transition to a corps structure actually began under Syrskyi, but after Drapatyi’s appointment, Zelenskyy specifically tasked him with preparing the next steps in the corps reform.

In a conversation with “Shelter,” experts and military officials spoke positively about Drapatyi’s approach of granting corps greater autonomy in command.

“Since 2024, Russia has been waging war with large formations: corps and armies. Therefore, it is extremely important for Ukraine to restructure. Such a restructuring will make our military and defense as a whole more resilient. A corps has its own set of troops, including its own artillery. In other words, these are no longer attached units. With the transition to the corps system, we will largely leave the practice of attached units in the past—perhaps not 100%, but 90%. Previously, this system had very negative consequences, especially for territorial defense units,” says Valentin Badrak, director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies.

According to him, such a decision could indeed change a great deal on the battlefield and make Ukraine’s defense more resilient. “In fact, this involves consolidating troops, which gives military commanders significantly more opportunities for operational command and control,” explains the military expert.

Hennadiy Druzenko also points out that the autonomy of corps commanders could genuinely change the situation on the battlefield. According to him, a corps should essentially be a small army that includes everything necessary: a fully-fledged medical unit, unmanned systems, and mechanized units. The commander has his own area of responsibility and must fully secure it with his own forces and resources within the framework of the overall strategic plan.

“Right now, the front lines often end up being a ‘mishmash’: various units, attached subunits, and ‘rapid-response teams’ from assault regiments. This creates a very unhealthy atmosphere. Instead, there should be a corps, with brigade and battalion commanders under its command, and the entire chain of command should bear personal responsibility for carrying out assigned tasks—provided, of course, that these tasks are not absurd or criminal,” he explains.

This allows the commander to fully plan operations, set priorities, allocate resources, and maneuver forces and assets. “In other words, a specific section of the front should be covered by a specific corps, not a mix of different units that constantly has to be reinforced by ‘rapid-response teams,’” says Druzenko.

Fedorenko adds that another priority already underway is a change in the approach to distributing mobilization resources among military units. Whereas previously reinforcements were prioritized for certain units, while others were systematically understaffed, now staffing levels are being balanced, in particular by strengthening brigades that were previously outside the main focus.

"At the same time, the principle for distributing military personnel—including those mobilized, those returning from the National Guard, and other categories—is also changing. They should be assigned to specific positions based on their professional skills and prior experience so that a person’s civilian expertise can be utilized as effectively as possible in the military. We will see the results of this in the future. This is a complex issue that cannot be resolved in a few days. But if we implement these decisions today, we will reap the necessary results in six months,” says the commander of “Achilles.”

Zhorin says that assessing the battlefield itself is extremely important: what the planning and strategic vision for the deployment of troops will look like.

“We need to move away from reactive, situational responses to enemy actions toward more planned, tactical decisions, as well as toward truly scaling up the successful experience of our units—including the Third Army Corps. I would like to note separately that our military decisions should not be politicized; rather, they should be more practical and correspond to the actual situation and conditions on the battlefield. And finally, I would like to eradicate the system of positive reports that do not correspond to reality,” says Zhorin.

In a conversation with “Shelter,” the view was repeatedly expressed that Drapatyi’s appointment, his experience, and his reputation have given the military hope for positive change, and this, too, can be considered an achievement.

“As of now, the main result is hope—a kind of new momentum that is undoubtedly associated with Drapatyi. But if it is not backed up by concrete management decisions—for example, specific changes at the command level of the troops—then this hope will quickly fade,” Badrak concludes.