Negotiations, blackmail of Europe, or mobilization: What to expect from Putin in the near future

On September 1, he called the actions of the Ukrainian authorities “state terrorism,” and, as he put it, Moscow does not negotiate with “terrorists.” A few days later, he asserted that Russia and Ukraine must reach an agreement on ending the war on their own, and reported that the intelligence services of both countries were in contact. On September 5, he received U.S. President’s special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Moscow.

At the same time as this ostentatious public display of a desire for peace, Putin entered a new round of confrontation with the West. Germany accused Russia of orchestrating an attack on the Leipzig/Halle Airport, and in response, Moscow has issued new threats of possible strikes against military facilities in Western countries.

It is telling that all of this took place against the backdrop of one of the most intense recent waves of Russian attacks on Kyiv and the surrounding region, during which Russia struck Ukrainian businesses and civilian targets almost around the clock. “Shelter” analyzed what this indicates.

Putin’s Shift in Rhetoric—and What Does China Have to Do With It?

Another shift in Putin’s rhetoric occurred following the summit (August 31–September 1, 2026) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, where the Russian dictator met with the leaders of China and India—the very countries on which the Russian economy currently depends the most. During the summit, the need to end the war was repeatedly emphasized, to which Putin responded that he, too, was interested in doing so.

“China controls Russia. More precisely, it controls Putin. Just look at how Putin spoke with Xi Jinping: he was, in essence, reporting to him. It was absolutely clear who was in charge there. Economically, Russia depends on China. China can stop this war in a single second, because the shadow economy—the smuggling of parts and critical components for Russian missiles and the Russian military-industrial complex—runs through China,” Russian opposition figure Garry Kasparov emphasized at a roundtable discussion at the Atlantic Council.

According to an analysis by the U.S. Commission on Economic and Security Relations with China (USCC), over the course of more than four years of war, Beijing has effectively become the main external pillar of the Russian economy.

So China is playing its own strategic game and weakening Russia. Kasparov is convinced that one of the things Xi Jinping did was to forbid Putin from even considering the use of nuclear weapons. Because he understands that as soon as Russia uses nuclear weapons, Japan—and most likely Taiwan—as well as South Korea will become nuclear powers. And for China, that is absolutely unacceptable.

Why is Putin seeking confrontation with Germany and intimidating ordinary Europeans?

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the conflict with Germany “the beginning of a real war.” In a conversation with “Shelter,” the interviewees describe this as “classic Russian intimidation.”

Russian opposition figure and former State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev expresses the view that, on Russia’s part, this is nothing more than intimidation albeit an effective one, since the vast majority of ordinary Germans are afraid of Russia.

“Germany, on the one hand, is the most powerful country in the European Union; on the other hand, it is the one that is easiest to intimidate. They do not want a confrontation with Russia. This is still a hangover from World War II. That is precisely why Moscow understands this and tries to exploit it as much as possible. In addition to being a form of intimidation, in their view, it also affects the domestic political situation in Germany, for example, the popularity of the AfD (“Alternative for Germany”—a far-right, populist, and national-conservative party in Germany—Ed.). “And when Russia effectively instills fear, they believe this will increase support for the AfD, because those people who say, ‘Let’s be friends with Russia instead’—they’ll go and vote for the AfD,” Ponomarev explained.

If we look at the preliminary results of the election held this past weekend in Saxony-Anhalt, we can see that the far-right “Alternative for Germany” has, according to preliminary counts, secured a historic victory. According to preliminary official results, the AfD received 43.8% of the vote—more than double the share of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s “Christian Democratic Union,” which garnered only 17.2%.

Political analysts note that Putin’s bellicose rhetoric is aimed at voters in other European countries where elections are scheduled to take place. After all, voters will cast their ballots for those who promise to keep their country out of a war with Russia—and thus reduce support for Ukraine.

Andreas Umland, a German political scientist and expert at the European Political Institute in Kyiv, asserts that the intensification of Russian pressure on Germany is primarily linked to the role Berlin currently plays in supporting Ukraine. Against the backdrop of waning U.S. involvement, Germany is increasingly taking on the role of one of Kyiv’s key partners. As the expert notes, countries such as Sweden or Denmark may even be more pro-Ukrainian, but their political and economic clout is significantly smaller.

“That’s why, I think, Russia is trying to intimidate the Germans so that they change their position and reduce their support for Ukraine,” Umland tells “Shelter.”

In his view, Putin is banking on his own knowledge of Germany, where he once served for five years in Dresden, Saxony. The Kremlin is banking on German society’s fear of a direct confrontation with Russia. And to some extent, this tactic is already paying off.

As an example, Umland cites the debate over the transfer of Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine. Although most Germans generally support Ukraine, the transfer of long-range missiles is meeting with significantly more resistance due to fears that it could draw Germany directly into the war.

According to the analyst, public opinion is not the only factor shaping German policy, but the government cannot ignore it. If a majority of Germans were to oppose not just specific types of weapons but aid to Ukraine in general, this would inevitably affect Berlin’s policy.

However, there has been no such shift yet. The majority of the public continues to support Ukraine, as do the main centrist political parties—the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and the Greens. That is precisely why, Umland suggests, Moscow is trying to stoke fears of a possible escalation and gradually shift public sentiment within Germany.

Will Putin back down from mobilization and escalation?

In a conversation with “Shelter,” no one doubts that Putin will continue to pursue his goal of “crushing Ukraine.” Right now, he is trying to engage in double diplomacy and pretend that he seeks peace talks. This is meant to demonstrate, on the one hand, to China and India, and on the other, to the U.S., that negotiations with him are possible and that he is open to dialogue.

One of the biggest threats to the Kremlin right now remains the sanctions bill named after Lindsey Graham, which the Senate has approved but which is stalled in the House of Representatives. If the bill is passed and signed by Trump, the U.S. will have the right to impose tariffs of up to 100% on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas, as well as on the five countries that help Russia circumvent energy sanctions. China, India, and Turkey are currently the largest buyers of Russian energy resources.

Unlike external threats, the domestic situation in Russia poses no danger to Putin. According to Western intelligence reports, he plans to carry out a mobilization after the September State Duma elections, which “Shelter” has covered in detail.

Kasparov notes that there is little information about what is actually happening in Russia. However, from what is already evident: there is currently no internal threat to Putin.

“Right now, the entire country has been put on a war footing. Every aspect of Russian life—society, politics, the economy, industry, everything from kindergarten to the highest echelons of power—is war, war, war. Yes, potential problems could arise if mobilization affects Moscow and St. Petersburg, especially the Moscow region. But when it comes to the war’s impact on the rest of the country, it has actually increased social mobility. Ten million rubles for each casualty is a fortune for many poor regions. I don’t think there’s overwhelming support for the war, but there’s practically no opposition to it,” Kasparov concludes.

It seems Putin is keeping as many options open as possible. If negotiations allow him to get what he wants without further war, Moscow will try to take advantage of them. If not, Russia retains the ability to continue its strikes, replenish its army, raise the stakes, and intimidate the West.